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LABOR IN FAITH: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
HOSANNA-TABOR V. EEOC THROUGH THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER JURISPRUDENCE
Francesca M. Genova*
Who so upon him selfe will take the skill
True Justice unto people to divide,
Had neede have mightie hands, for to fulfill
That, which he doth with righteous doome decide,
And for to maister wrong and puissant pride.1
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Human
Rights recently have decided cases about religious organizations’ freedom to
decide whom they employ, underscoring this question’s vitality and complexity. Absent here are the cultural complications present in more contentious
religious rulings. Some of Europe’s oldest established religions have found
their employment decisions scrutinized at the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR or European Court).2 In the United States, meanwhile, a
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; Bachelor of Arts in
English, Providence College, 2011. I would like to thank Professor Paolo G. Carozza, my
Note advisor, for his gracious guidance. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my family for
their love and support. Thanks go out to Volume 90 of the Notre Dame Law Review as well,
in particular for navigating the complexities of European cases.
1 EDMUND SPENSER, THE FAERIE QUEENE, bk. V, Canto IV, at 40 (Alfred B. Gough ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1932) (1590).
2 Granted, many of these established religions’ practical influence has declined.
While 73.4% of Spaniards considered themselves Catholic in 2012, only 13.6% claimed
that they “practice their faith and attend services on Sunday and holy days.” Only 13 Percent
of Spain’s Catholics Say They Practice Faith, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:05 PM),
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/only-13-percent-of-spains-catholics-say-theypractice-faith/. In 2012, 5% of the population in the European Union mentioned religion
as one of the most important values. EUROPEAN COMM’N, STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 77:
THE VALUES OF EUROPEANS 9 (Spring 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_value_en.pdf. The population of the European
Union valued human rights (at 43%), respect for human life (at 43%), and peace (at 40%)
as the most important personal values for the European Union. Id. Following behind at
28% was democracy, then at 23% individual freedom. Id. In this ranking, equality, solidar419
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Lutheran school was the Supreme Court’s subject.3 European Court cases
have involved the Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany, known as
the “big Churches,”4 and the Catholic Church in Spain, which brought
Catholicism to the Americas.5 Only the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, with 38,992 members in Germany currently, is relatively new to its host
country.6
ity, and tolerance occupied the middle fourth of values, while self-fulfillment, respect for
other cultures, and religion were the bottom three values ranked, in order. Id. While the
European Union and the Council of Europe, the organization associated with the European Court of Human Rights, are distinct entities, these statistics provide insight into the
values that may animate the European Court of Human Rights, as it sees itself as a part of
current European discourse.
In the United States, 27% of Catholics consider themselves “‘strong’ Catholics,” while
54% of Protestants describe themselves as having a “strong” religious identity. ‘Strong’ Catholic Identity at a Four-Decade Low in U.S., PEW RESEARCH RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT (Mar.
13, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/03/13/strong-catholic-identity-at-a-four-dec
ade-low-in-us/. For more information, including regarding church attendance and methodology of the survey, see id.
3 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
4 Schüth v. Germany, App. No. 1620/03, ¶ 30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469. The Catholic Church has about
24.9 million members in Germany, while the Protestant Church of Germany counts
roughly 24.5 million members. The two churches in Germany employ more than one
million people, particularly through charities: their two respective main charities, Caritas
and Diakonie, employ respectively roughly 500,000 and 450,000 persons. Id. ¶ 31.
5 See Sharon M. Hannon, Birth of a New World Religion, PUB. BROAD. SERV., http://
web.archive.org/web/20140329131208/http://www.pbs.org/kcet/when-worlds-collide/
essays/birth-of-a-new-world-religion.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2014) (detailing the Spanish
conversion of indigenous populations in the Americas). The internationally controversial
issues of religious freedom in the European Court of Human Rights involve religions professed by migrant communities. Many issues have concerned legislation that largely affects
Muslim practices, including the minaret ban in Switzerland and the head covering ban in
France. A number of commentators have addressed these topics in detail. The religious
employment cases deal with Christian denominations, oftentimes historically majority religions in their host countries; consequently, this Note’s analysis can avoid delving into this
complex area of jurisprudence. See Kathryn Boustead, The French Headscarf Law Before the
European Court of Human Rights, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 167 (2007) (detailing the
prohibition of headscarves in France); Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves from French Public Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 251 (2006) (discussing the French secular ideal of laı̈cité and
religious apparel restrictions in the United States); Urs Geiser, Legal Move Against Minaret
Ban Thrown Out, SWISS BROAD. CORP. (July 8, 2011, 12:52 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/
eng/politics/Legal_move_against_minaret_ban_thrown_out.html?cid=30640398 (reporting that the European Court declared the appeals against the minaret ban inadmissible
because the applicants had not planned on building a minaret-bearing mosque in the near
future).
6 Facts and Statistics, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, http://www
.mormonnewsroom.org/facts-and-statistics/country/germany/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
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While any analysis must respect differences in the two courts’ structures,
scopes, purposes, cultural sensibilities, and philosophical backgrounds,7 a
comparison elucidates the strengths and potential weaknesses of American
jurisprudence.8 Both courts are constitutional in nature: the Supreme Court
interprets its Constitution, and the European Court of Human Rights largely
treats its role in applying the European Convention on Human Rights9 (the
European Convention or the Convention) as a constitutional one.10 Indeed,
some have argued that the European Court has developed “an Americanstyle body of constitutional law, comparable in its level of ambition.”11
The U.S. Constitution and the European Convention historically left
religious freedom to the states.12 The European Court previously gave states,
which have diverse religious affiliations, broad deference for religious issues
before adopting its current, stricter jurisprudence.13 In the United States’
first 150 years under the Constitution, the states reserved power over relig7 Not least the way the Courts see themselves—the European Court refers to itself as
“the conscience of Europe,” whereas some members of the Supreme Court often advocate
that moral questions not specifically embodied in the Constitution should be left to the
political branches. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE
(2010); Mark Schliebs, Antonin Scalia Shoots from the Hip on ‘Undemocratic’ European Union,
THE AUSTRALIAN (Feb. 4, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/
legal-affairs/antonin-scalia-shoots-from-the-hip-on-undemocratic-european-union/storye6frg97x-1225999732107 (quoting Justice Scalia as criticizing the ECtHR because “[i]t is a
prescription for the elimination of democracy to establish a court that is to provide binding and authoritative answers” to “controversial topics on which domestic elections are won
or lost”).
8 The inverse analysis is done for Europe: in the European Court of Human Rights’
Grand Chamber appeal of Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain, a third party cites Hosanna-Tabor v.
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission as an example of jurisprudence concerning religious communities’ autonomy that the European Court of Human Rights should follow,
highlighting the importance of this comparison. Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 101 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145068.
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
10 Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Order, in
A EUROPE OF RIGHTS 3, 7 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
11 MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (2007). Additionally, both may look to international jurisprudence in their own
rulings, although the United States is more averse to using international law because of its
“anti-democratic” nature. See MAGDALENA FOROWICZ, THE RECEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010) (examining the use of international law in the ECtHR); Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law
in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1992) (detailing
the use of international law in American jurisprudence).
12 Andrea Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human
Rights’ Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 627, 647 (2011).
13 Id. at 647. For example, the United Kingdom has an established church, Ireland
mentions the Holy Trinity in its Constitution, Greece maintains the Orthodox Church as
its official religion, and Norway officially is Lutheran. Id. at 639.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL110.txt

422

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

8-DEC-14

14:53

[vol. 90:1

ious liberty determinations.14 Established religions existed in seven states at
the time of the First Amendment’s ratification and their vestiges remained
into the 19th century.15 Only in 1947, twelve years before the European
Court started operation, did the Supreme Court incorporate the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause with the First Amendment religion clauses
to unify these principles nationally.16
This Note uses the European Court of Human Rights’ framework to analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, which recognizes a “ministerial exception” for religious organizations as a defense to certain employment claims.17 It argues
that the unanimous Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor examines factors similar to those of its European counterpart, but protects religious liberties more
robustly by avoiding some of the European Court’s preoccupations.18 Yet,
the European Court’s assessment anticipates the difficulties of applying the
“ministerial exception” in future cases.
Part I of this Note compares the European Court of Human Rights and
the Supreme Court, focusing on the courts’ preliminary interpretive principles, to contextualize the two courts’ decisions. Part II analyzes four recent
European Court cases involving religious organizations that terminate or fail
to renew an employee’s contract for violations of religious tenets. It enumerates seven factors used by the ECtHR in determining whether a national
court adequately has balanced the rights of employees and religious employers.19 Four factors consider the religious employer: (1) the alignment of the
religious employer’s asserted value with the host country’s laws and society,
(2) the belief’s centrality in the employer’s religious system, (3) the importance of the individual’s position to the religious institution’s affairs and
image, and (4) the reasonableness of the employer’s concern that the
employee’s actions harmed its credibility.20 Three factors address the
employee: (1) the employee’s awareness that his or her actions would upset
his or her religious employer, (2) the employee’s role in exposing his or her
problematic conduct to the employer, and (3) the consequences of dismissal
on the employee’s career.21
Part III analyzes how the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in HosannaTabor v. EEOC converges with and diverges from that of the European Court.
It argues that the United States’ lack of a right to work allows the Supreme
14 JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 110 (3d ed. 2011).
15 Id. at 57–58.
16 Id. at 110; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE COURT IN BRIEF 2, http://www
.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
17 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012). Who qualifies as a “minister” is an open issue for the Court. For an analysis of this
issue, see infra Part III.
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Section II.B.
20 See infra subsection II.B.1.
21 See infra subsection II.B.2.
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Court to defer more to religious organizations’ decisions. The European
Court decides cases with the background principle that an employee has a
right to an occupation.22 The Supreme Court, however, more easily protects
religious freedom because it does not recognize the countervailing right to
work. Part III also argues that religious organizations’ autonomy has become
a part of the legal heritage of the United States. So, even an analysis regarding common beliefs similar to the European Court’s and in line with Employment Division v. Smith23 favors the “ministerial exception.” The United States’
refusal to decide which tenets are valuable to a religion also protects religious
employers more broadly than does the European Court’s analysis. Part IV
concludes by affirming the benefits of Hosanna-Tabor as compared to the
European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence.
I. THE EUROPEAN COURT
A.

OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

AND THE

SUPREME COURT

Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence
Compared to American Jurisprudence

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights defines religious freedom under the heading, “[f]reedom of thought, conscience and
religion.”24 Article 9 states: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice
and observance.”25 As is common in international instruments, a qualifying
provision stipulates that this freedom is “subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”26 Religious rights
are not absolute. The ECtHR has stated that autonomy of religious communities “is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society, and is at the
heart of the protection afforded by Article 9,” but religious freedom is an
individual right that only extends to groups when combined with the freedom of association under Article 11.27
Freedom of religion in the United States, meanwhile, is enshrined in the
First Amendment of the Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respect22 Virginia Mantouvalou, Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An
Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529,
536 (2013).
23 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
24 Convention, supra note 9, art. 9.
25 Id. art. 9, § 1.
26 Id. art. 9, § 2.
27 Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), translated in
Siebenhaar v. Germany – Chamber Judgment, STRASBOURG CONSORTIUM, http://www.stras
bourgconsortium.org/common/document.view.php?docId=5201 (last visited Oct. 23,
2014).
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ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”28
Additionally, many legislative acts in the United States protect religion to a
greater extent than the courts have ruled that the Constitution does, and can
preempt the need to decide a constitutional question. Congress and the
executive oftentimes will create a religious exception when they recognize
that a law or regulation needs one to retain its constitutionality or legality,
desire to avoid an issue even where it may be constitutionally allowed, or want
to provide a heightened level of protection in response to court decisions
holding that the Constitution does not extend so broadly.29
28 U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a historical account of these clauses from their conception until modern day, see WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 14.
29 An example of such an administrative exemption concerns the much-discussed
Department of Health and Human Services contraceptive mandate, which allows for “religious employer[s],” primarily understood to be “houses of worship,” to be exempted from
providing contraception coverage in health insurance to their employees. Press Release,
Administration Issues Final Rules on Contraception Coverage and Religious Organizations,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 28, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2013pres/06/20130628a.html.
Another example of legislative protection is the response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, in which the Court held that the ritual use of peyote
could be outlawed criminally. 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). The Court reasoned that “generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious
practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 886 n.3.
Although the majority opinion claimed that it was in line with precedent, this decision was
seen as “thr[owing] away decades of precedent and water[ing] down the religious liberty of
all Americans.” Opinion, Congress Defends Religious Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1993,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/25/opinion/congress-defends-religious-freedom.html.
Indeed, many, including Justice O’Connor, believed that the Court was rejecting the previous rule that the government “justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”
Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). In response, Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, enacted in 1993, which attempted to correct the perceived change and currently still governs federal action. Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (2012) (RFRA). Its application
to state law was declared unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Another example of a statutory protection is the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012), implemented in 2000. Some commentators have expressed dissatisfaction at this solution, as it makes such protection statutory—
susceptible to legislative change in the future—rather than constitutional. See W. Cole
Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REV. 421, 447 (stating, regarding the impending
passage of RFRA, the concern that “prevailing on a statutory RFRA claim will not have the
same symbolic significance that vindication of a constitutional claim has long carried” and
that “as with any statute, there is a practical risk that particular protections may be eroded
by subsequent legislative enactments”).
The European Court of Human Rights also has used Smith’s line of reasoning, including in two cases that upheld Greece’s requirement that secondary school students participate in a parade commemorating the start of war between Germany and Italy in the 1940s.
Boustead, supra note 5, at 175–76. Critiques of this ECtHR policy echo one of the criticisms against Employment Division v. Smith: “by declaring neutral laws incapable of causing

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL110.txt

2014]

B.

unknown

a comparative analysis of

Seq: 7

HOSANNA-TABOR

8-DEC-14

14:53

425

The European Court of Human Rights in Relation to the Supreme Court

The European Court of Human Rights has been called “the single most
important rights-protecting tribunal in the world.”30 In the states parties to
the Convention, which may be brought before the Court, “there is no aspect
of national affairs which can be said to be without implications for one or
other of the rights protected by the Convention, [thus] there is no matter of
domestic law and policy which may not eventually reach the European
Court.”31 Its judgments are binding on the states parties to the Convention,
but require state implementation.32 While the Convention contains substantive rights, the European Court “has been reluctant to explicitly pronounce”
that a national law’s substance violates the Convention; rather, it “confines
itself to finding fault” in national courts’ “application or interpretation” of it,
allowing countries broad latitude in determining the appropriate remedy.33
Chambers of seven judges, which may decide admissibility, render judgment on the merits.34 In certain circumstances, a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges, a limited appellate court, reviews cases de novo.35 The
European Court only accepts cases that have exhausted the remedies
processes in their states, functioning more like a court of final appeal than an
international tribunal.36 State compliance rates are high, leading to the coninterference [with religious belief], the [ECtHR] indirectly protects mainstream religions
over minorities.” Id. at 176. While a comparison between the neutrality doctrines promulgated by the Supreme Court in Smith and the European Court of Human Rights would
elucidate American jurisprudence, it is outside the scope of this Note, as the cases analyzed
largely do not concern laws of general applicability that limit religion, but rather instances
where religious deference may impinge employees’ rights. For an analysis of Smith in the
context of religious garb like the subject of French prohibition, see Walterick, supra note 5,
at 263–69.
30 Dia Anagnostou, Untangling the Domestic Implementation of the European Court of
Human Rights’ Judgments, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1 (Dia Anagnostou
ed., 2013). For analyses of states’ application of ECtHR judgments, see THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra (examining Germany, Italy, Romania, Austria, Bulgaria,
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom), and A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 10 (analyzing the reception process in Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden,
Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey,
Poland, Slovakia, Russia, and Ukraine).
31 J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2d ed. 1993).
32 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN FACTS AND
FIGURES 8 (2010).
33 Anagnostou, supra note 30, at 7.
34 Convention, supra note 9, arts. 26, 29.
35 Id. arts. 26, 30. These circumstances arise when cases “raise[ ] a serious question
affecting the interpretation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto,” have judgments
that may be inconsistent with prior judgments, or are given to the Grand Chamber by the
Chamber before it has rendered the judgment. Id. art. 30.
36 Anagnostou, supra note 30, at 5.
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clusion that the European Court is “as effective as . . . any domestic court.”37
The Grand Chamber on appeal decided only one of the four cases analyzed,
while Chambers alone decided the other three.
The European Court of Human Rights envisions itself as “the conscience
of Europe.”38 The European Court characterizes the Convention as a “living
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.”39 Its interpretation allows the Convention to remain “a resolutely
modern treaty that can adapt to contemporary social issues.”40 The ECtHR
holds that the provisions of the Convention “cannot be interpreted solely in
accordance with the intentions of their authors as expressed more than forty
years ago.”41 A main concern is maintaining effectiveness and relevance.42
Thus, the ECtHR often will take a “top-down” approach to new interpretations of rights.43 A state may have positive obligations to protect
37 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 296 (1997) (quoting John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, The
Uneven, but Growing, Role of International Law, in RETHINKING AMERICA’S SECURITY 279, 287
(Graham Allison & Gregory F. Treverton eds., 1992)). Compliance does not imply cheerful acceptance, however. For example, a recent ECtHR decision releasing some Spanish
prisoners was met with protests of 200,000 people, a warning from the chief justice of
Spain’s highest court about the “social alarm” that the decision creates, and a statement by
the Prime Minister of Spain that the decision is “unfair and wrong” but “the basic rule of
the democratic system is that the rulings of courts must be respected.” Fiona Govan, Spain
Forced to Release Terrorists and Murderers by European Human Rights Ruling, THE TELEGRAPH
(Dec. 2, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/
10489860/Spain-forced-to-release-terrorists-and-murderers-by-European-human-rights-ruling.html.
38 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 7.
39 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 71 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57920.
40 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 32, at 7.
41 Loizidou, App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 71. This tenet is one of the greatest differences
between ECtHR and Supreme Court jurisprudence.
42 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, ¶ 74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60596 (“It is of crucial
importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its
rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.”).
43 See id. The European Court, in standard language, stated:
While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is
in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it
should not depart, without good reason, from precedents . . . . However, since the
Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the
Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State
and within Contracting States generally and respond . . . to any evolving
convergence . . . .
Id. Some European commentators and justices of domestic courts have criticized this topdown approach. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Rise of Equality in International Law and its Pitfalls: Learning from Comparative Constitutional Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 24–25 (2010)
(arguing that international courts including the ECtHR “should not blithely interfere with,
or substitute their analyses of socioeconomic legislation for, that of democratically elected
legislators and competent constitutional adjudicators, particularly in disputes that have
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human rights, rather than simply a negative duty to refrain from rights violations.44
Rights-enumerating, “nonoriginalist” policies approach the Constitution
in a similar way to how the European Court of Human Rights interprets the
Convention.45 Textual formalism or originalism, an understanding that the
text of the Constitution has “an objective, stable, and discoverable historical
meaning that can function as a fixed rule of decision,” arguably aligns less
with the European Court’s jurisprudence.46 This dialectic in American jurisprudence remains one of the hallmark differences between the Supreme
Court and the ECtHR.
In the European Court, rights uniformity inherently is in tension with
respect for the self-government of member states.47 Of great importance is
the principle of subsidiarity and its corollary, the margin of appreciation,
which attempt to balance a unified application of human rights norms with
the legitimate legal and cultural diversity of the parties to the Convention.48
The “margin of appreciation” doctrine informs the amount of discretion that
the ECtHR allows member states in the implementation of the Convention.49
This doctrine is not well-defined, and often is applied flexibly.50 Factors in
determining the margin of appreciation include: (1) the seriousness of the
been carefully scrutinized by responsible domestic institutions”); Owen Bowcott, Senior
Judge: European Court of Human Rights Undermining Democratic Process, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
28, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/28/european-court-ofhuman-rights (quoting U.K. Supreme Court Justice Lord Sumpton, claiming that the
ECtHR may violate the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 in its lack of
deference to the original purpose of the Convention).
44 Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03, ¶¶ 40–42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), translated in
Obst v. Germany – Chamber Judgment, STRASBOURG CONSORTIUM, http://www.strasbourgcon
sortium.org/common/document.view.php?docId=5084 (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
45 As an international organization created by treaty, the European Court of Human
Rights interprets the Convention in light of its “object and purpose.” See Daniel Rietiker,
From Prevention to Facilitation? Suicide in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the Light of the Recent
Haas v. Switzerland Judgment, 25 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 94 (2012) (stating that the “flexibility of the ‘object and purpose’ formula has allowed the Court to develop its own methods
of interpretation”).
46 Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of
Religion or Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1187, 1234 (2005).
47 Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 95 (2003).
48 See PATRICIA WIATER, INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION (2010). Subsidiarity, a complex concept understood at minimum as “the principle that each social and political group should help smaller or more
local ones accomplish their respective ends without . . . arrogating those tasks to itself,” is
formally recognized in the European Union as a core principle and exists as a background
justification for the “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a
Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 38 & n.1 (2003).
49 FOROWICZ, supra note 11, at 7.
50 Id.; Seibert-Fohr, supra note 43, at 35 (noting that this doctrine “ha[s] been criticized as lacking doctrinal coherence and predictability and leaving too much room for
judicial value judgments”).
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violation, (2) the domestic government’s ability to evaluate the situation
more effectively, (3) the right’s importance, (4) the Convention’s language
and purpose, (5) the circumstances surrounding the case, (6) the type of
interference alleged, and (7) broad policy considerations.51 The Court will
acknowledge new violations of the Convention if it interprets the respondent
state’s laws to be different from the current European trends.52 Generally, if
there is a broad consensus among member states, the European Court will
hold countries unaligned with this consensus to a stricter standard, whereas if
there is diversity, it will give countries more discretion.53
II. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASES INVOLVING RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES
The European Convention on Human Rights enumerates two main
rights at issue in the religious employment cases analyzed. Article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights protects the “[f]reedom of thought,
conscience and religion.”54 It exists primarily with the individual. This individual freedom issues forth the subsidiary collective right.55 Hence, for religious groups, Article 9 freedoms must be combined with associative freedoms
51 FOROWICZ, supra note 11, at 8.
52 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, ¶ 60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1981),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57473 (noting that “the
great majority” of member states no longer criminalize homosexual acts in its decision to
declare such criminalization a violation of the Convention); Goodwin v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 28957/95, ¶¶ 84–85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-60596 (holding that the United Kingdom’s refusal to change the
gender on a post-operative transsexual person’s birth certificate violates the Convention,
considering that there was an “emerging consensus within Contracting States” of providing
legal recognition to gender reassignments).
53 FOROWICZ, supra note 11, at 8.
54 Convention, supra note 9, art. 9. The European Court of Human Rights uses
roughly the same balancing test in each of its decisions concerning the rights of employers
under Articles 9 and 11 against the rights of employees under Articles 8 and 9. See supra
Section II.B. This Note does not detail Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, which held that a Catholic
university could not decline to renew a professor’s contract for making statements deemed
contrary to Church teaching. This is a result of the ECtHR’s indication that Lombardi
Vallauri was not given adequate notice of the statements that went against Catholic Church
teaching, as distinguished from the cases analyzed. Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, App. No.
39128/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009), translated in Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, STRASBOURG CONSORTIUM,
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/common/document.view.php?docId=
5423 (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). Another case not considered is Sindicatul “Pastoral Cel
Bun” v. Romania, which addresses competing Article 11 claims—the unionization of religious employees, including priests, versus the rights of religious organizations—as this case
balances two collective right claims. Sindicatul “Pastoral Cel Bun” v. Romania [GC], App.
No. 2330/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-122763. Here, the Romanian government could allow the Romanian
Orthodox Church to reject its priests’ unionization attempts. Id. ¶ 173.
55 Convention, supra note 9, arts. 9, 11; Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández
Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 127 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145068.
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in Article 11; there is no enumerated “group right” to religious freedom.
Only the manifestation of belief, not belief itself, may be limited by law as
“necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”56 Siebenhaar v. Germany, discussed below,
involved an employee asserting an individual Article 9 right against her religious employer.57
Against these Article 9 freedoms is the countervailing Article 8 right,
“respect for private and family life.”58 Employees often assert this right in
cases concerning religious employers. The Court has recognized that “privacy” under Article 8 is a broad term that cannot be defined fully and encompasses physical and moral integrity, as well as at times physical and social
identity—including the rights to “‘personal development,’” “self-determination,” and development of “relationships with others.”59 Article 8 also protects the “personal sphere” of one’s sexual identity, name, sexual orientation,
and sexual life.60 Article 8 claims against religious employers exist in the
twin cases Obst v. Germany61 and Schüth v. Germany,62 decided the same day,
and Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain,63 with the Chamber judgment decided in
2012 and Grand Chamber judgment in 2014. In these cases, the European
Court forms a coherent jurisprudence regarding religious employers’ freedoms as balanced against employees’ rights.
A.
1.

Cases

Siebenhaar v. Germany

In Siebenhaar v. Germany, the European Court considered an employee’s
asserted Article 9 rights against a religious employer. Here, a Protestant
church fired a kindergarten teacher for teaching outside of her job about a
different denomination called the Universal Church, to which she had converted from Catholicism.64 The Labour Court held that the Protestant
church had the right to require that employees refrain from activities seem56 Convention, supra note 9, art. 9, § 2.
57 Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), translated in
Siebenhaar v. Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 27.
58 Convention, supra note 9, arts. 8, 9.
59 Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), translated in Obst v.
Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 44.
60 Id. (citations omitted).
61 Id.
62 App. No. 1620/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469.
63 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145068;
Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [Chamber] (Fernández Martı́nez II), App. No. 56030/07 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110916.
64 Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02, ¶¶ 9–12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), translated in Siebenhaar v. Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 27.
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ingly incongruous with their loyalty to the religion.65 The teacher’s proclamation that she wanted to help the Universal Church become victorious
throughout the world, the Labour Court held, expressed her view of its superiority over other churches.66 The Labour Appeal Court, conversely, ruled in
her favor, holding that her activities did not jeopardize the credibility of the
Protestant church.67 Later, the Federal Labour Court quashed the appeal,
stating that the Protestant church had a reasonable concern that
Siebenhaar’s activities would affect her ability to teach, as the Universal
Church advocated the proclamation of its teachings in kindergartens.68 The
Federal Constitutional Court did not accept her complaint, holding that the
Federal Labour Court satisfactorily had balanced her rights against the right
of the Protestant church.69
The European Court analyzed the German Labour Courts’ balancing
test in holding that Germany did not violate Article 9 by allowing the church
to dismiss Siebenhaar.70 The Protestant church had a reasonable concern
that her beliefs could affect her teaching; also, she was young enough and
had worked at the school for such little time that the church could dismiss
her.71 Under these circumstances, Germany could permit the Protestant
church to dismiss the teacher without violating the Convention.
2.

Obst v. Germany

In Obst v. Germany, the European Court balanced a religious employer’s
claims against the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life. Obst, a
Mormon, worked as a public relations director for the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints in Europe.72 His employment contract stipulated that
employees whose jobs involved interacting with non-Mormons must adhere
to increased obligations of behavior.73 To receive help, he told a member of
the Church that he had been unfaithful.74 The Church, in turn, dismissed
him.75 The Labour Court held that his dismissal was disproportionate, since
he had tried to repent.76 The German Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal, although it acknowledged adultery’s gravity for Mormons, reasoning
that Obst had confessed his infidelity in order to remedy the situation.77 The
65 Id. ¶ 14.
66 Id.
67 Id. ¶ 15.
68 Id. ¶ 44.
69 Id. ¶ 19.
70 Id. ¶ 40.
71 Id. ¶ 44.
72 Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 7 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), translated in Obst v.
Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 44.
73 Id. ¶ 8.
74 Id. ¶ 9.
75 Id.
76 Id. ¶ 10.
77 Id. ¶ 11.
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Federal Labour Court on appeal remanded the case because a religious
organization has the right under the Weimar Constitution to manage its own
affairs: while state labor law applied, the Church was entitled to require fidelity in order to preserve its own credibility.78 The Federal Constitutional
Court noted that it must balance competing interests of the individual and
the church, giving special weight to the current legal order and churches’
own understandings of their faiths.79
The European Court of Human Rights then heard the case. In this
venue, the applicant claimed that Germany had violated Article 8 in its decision, since he had not waived his right to privacy by signing the employment
contract.80 Germany, in its statement to the Court defending its position,
stated that religious institutions do not possess an unlimited right to make
employment decisions without state scrutiny;81 but in this case, the German
courts properly had weighed competing factors, since the applicant knew
fidelity’s primacy in the Mormon faith.82
In light of these considerations, the European Court held that the German courts had balanced properly Obst’s Article 8 rights against those of the
Mormon Church.83 Approvingly, the Court cited the German courts’ considerations: that fidelity aligned with the larger society’s fundamental principles
and is central to Mormonism, that the Church can act to maintain credibility,
that Obst had a lifelong knowledge of his faith’s requirements, that he had
informed the Church of his infidelity himself, and that he had held an
important position within the Church.84 The Court sustained Germany’s
finding in favor of the Church.85 Germany had not violated the Convention
by allowing Obst’s dismissal.
3.

Schüth v. Germany

At the same time that the European Court of Human Rights released its
opinion in Obst v. Germany, which allowed a church to fire an employee for
his infidelity, the Court handed down its decision in Schüth v. Germany with
the opposite result.86 In Schüth v. Germany, the applicant was a choirmaster
in a Catholic parish in Germany.87 His employment contract required him
“to discharge [his] professional duties and to fulfil and observe ecclesiastical
obligations.”88 He left his wife and had an extramarital affair with another
78 Id. ¶ 13.
79 Id. ¶ 26.
80 Id. ¶ 32.
81 Id. ¶¶ 34–36.
82 Id. ¶ 36.
83 Id. ¶ 51.
84 Id. ¶¶ 47–51.
85 Id. ¶ 52.
86 App. No. 1620/03, ¶ 75 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469.
87 Id. ¶ 7.
88 Id. ¶ 9.
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woman, who was pregnant with his child.89 The dean for the parish confronted Schüth after his children told people at their kindergarten that he
was expecting another child.90 Thirteen days later, the church dismissed
Schüth for breaching his duty of loyalty under the church’s basic regulations
and accused him “not only of committing adultery but also of bigamy.”91
To the employment tribunal, this dismissal was unjustified.92 Schüth
“had not been bound by heightened duties of loyalty . . . did not perform
pastoral or catechistic duties, did not have a canonical mandate . . . and was
not a member of the managerial staff” as defined by the regulations.93 The
tribunal maintained that “father[ing] a child out of wedlock” was not serious
enough to warrant dismissal without warning, especially after fourteen years’
employment and without the prospect of easily finding comparable work as
an organist.94 Employment contracts encompassed both the freedom of contract and the protection of religious autonomy.95 The Catholic Church,
then, could base employment on a model of Christian service and require its
Catholic employees to comply with religious principles.96 Marriage in the
Catholic Church is “indissoluble, perpetual[,] and exclusive.”97 As a sacrament, it is a fundamental part of the faith.98 Yet, religious employers cannot
require “excessive” loyalty, and religious principles must not contradict general principles of law, including “morality” and “public order.”99 The
employment tribunal weighed the harm to the Church’s credibility in retaining the employee against the damage to the employee if dismissed.100 The
Federal Constitutional Court did not grant a constitutional complaint, thus
upholding the employment tribunal’s decision that the dismissal was legal.101
Two months later, the applicant found employment as a part-time choirmaster at a Protestant church.102
The applicant argued that the Catholic Church had violated his right to
private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention at the European
Court of Human Rights.103 The German courts had failed to consider his
interests, and unduly privileged churches.104 No right exists, he argued, for
churches to require that employees observe their precepts “outside of the
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶¶ 11–13.
¶ 12.
¶ 13.
¶ 16.
¶¶ 16–17.
¶ 20.
¶ 21.
¶ 22.
¶ 25.
¶ 27.
¶¶ 28, 48.
¶ 43.
¶ 46.
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occupational sphere.”105 His affair showed his own human frailty rather than
the Church’s lack of credibility.106 Against the claim he had a special “pastoral mission,” Schüth recognized the “particular role” of music in the liturgy, but contended that “each worshipper performed the liturgy with
singing and prayers to the same degree as the organist.”107 Furthermore,
canon law was unreasonable to demand that “he would lead a life of abstinence until the end of his days.”108 As in Obst, the German government
acknowledged limitations on churches’ right of autonomy, but argued that
the domestic courts’ decisions properly weighed concerns.109 While dismissal was indeed the harshest penalty in German labor law, a preliminary warning was unnecessary in Schüth’s case because he “could not have been
unaware” that his conduct would have been intolerable.110 In signing the
contract of work, Schüth freely had limited his rights.111
Here, the European Court of Human Rights found that Germany had
violated Article 8. The German Government had a positive obligation to protect Schüth’s Article 8 rights.112 The European Court noted, as in Obst, that
fidelity was consistent with German principles of law.113 The employment
tribunals, however, failed to consider Schüth’s “de facto family life or . . . the
legal protection afforded to it.”114 They solely had examined his interest in
keeping his job.115 As well, an employee in the German system cannot conceal information about his or her civil status.116 His employer would know
about disloyalty even without “media coverage or public repercussions.”117
The European Court further criticized the Employment Appeal Tribunal. It should not have accepted at face value the centrality of music to the
Church’s mission.118 Moreover, the balancing process is important when an
individual right is asserted against a collective right.119 Signing an employment contract, while it will indeed limit one’s private life to an extent, “cannot be interpreted as a personal unequivocal undertaking to live a life of
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. ¶ 47. The Catholic Diocese of Essen, where Schüth had worked, intervened as a
third party, stating that music had a “special function” in the liturgy, closely related to the
Church’s “proclamatory mission.” Thus, it argued, his employment should be a matter
exclusively reserved for the Church. Id. ¶ 52.
108 Id. ¶ 48. He also remarked that he accepted the consequence of not being able to
receive communion, but his dismissal was “excessively harsh.” Id.
109 Id. ¶¶ 50–51.
110 Id. ¶ 51.
111 Id.
112 Id. ¶ 55.
113 Id. ¶ 62.
114 Id. ¶ 67.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. ¶ 69.
119 Id.
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abstinence in the event of separation or divorce.”120 Last, “of particular
importance,” the job market for organists mostly is limited to churches and
the Protestant church’s rules only allowed hiring non-Protestants for parttime work.121 Schüth’s new part-time occupation could not replace his former position.122 These factors shifted the balance against the religious
employer so that Germany’s upholding of Schüth’s dismissal violated the
European Convention.
4.

Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain

The most recent case involving the balancing of employees’ rights
against religious employers is Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain, decided by the
Grand Chamber. In this case, the applicant was ordained as a priest in 1961
and applied to the Vatican for dispensation from the obligation to be celibate
in 1984.123 He married in a civil ceremony the following year as he awaited
dispensation.124 He had five children and was employed teaching Catholic
religion and ethics in a government-run secondary school under a contract
renewable yearly.125 Under an agreement between Spain and the Holy See
in 1979, the bishop of the diocese would confirm the contract renewal yearly,
binding the Ministry of Education to his decision.126 In 1996, a newspaper
article detailing the “Movement for Optional Celibacy” for priests included a
photograph of Fernández Martı́nez with his wife and children at a gathering
of the movement.127 It included statements that members wanted the Catholic Church to change its celibacy requirement,128 to become more “democratic rather than . . . theocratic” and to allow laypeople to elect priests and
bishops.129 The movement disagreed with the Church on divorce, abortion,
sexuality, and contraception.130
In 1997, the Church granted dispensation from celibacy, with the stipulation that it barred Fernández Martı́nez from teaching Catholicism in public
institutions unless the bishop permitted it “according to his own prudent
judgment . . . and provided that there [was] no scandal.”131 The school did
not renew Fernández Martı́nez’s contract; about a month later, the Diocese
declared that the publicity he received had breached his duty to avoid scan120
121
122
123
(Eur.
068.
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. ¶ 71.
Id. ¶ 73.
Id.
Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 13
Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶¶ 12–14.
¶ 14.
¶ 136.
¶ 15.

¶ 16.
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dal, and the Church’s authorities could not propose him as a candidate for
the position for the next year.132
The Employment Tribunal held that the Church had discriminated
against Fernández Martı́nez because of his membership in the Movement for
Optional Celibacy and marital status.133 The appellate court decided in
favor of the Ministry of Education against Fernández Martı́nez’s claim, stating
that Fernández Martı́nez’s employment, based in Catholic doctrine and
established in trust, falls between “pure ecclesiastical” work and “a skeleton
employment relationship.”134 The Constitutional Court dismissed Fernández Martı́nez’s subsequent appeal, noting that the Catholic Church under
the Spanish Constitution has a “fundamental right to religious freedom in its
collective or community dimension.”135
A Chamber of the ECtHR first heard the case before Fernández Martı́nez successfully appealed to the Grand Chamber. At this level, Fernández
Martı́nez claimed a violation under Article 8 of the Convention. The Spanish
government meanwhile stressed that the Spanish constitutional duty of neutrality requires Spain to permit the bishop to propose candidates for state
employment based on religious and moral criteria.136 The government
maintained that “it would not be reasonable” when selecting individuals who
had “freely applied” to a religious education post not to account for their
religious beliefs.137 It argued that neither domestic courts nor the European
Court could challenge the Catholic Church’s decision through a civil law
analysis.138 The applicant maintained, however, that his participation in the
movement had not justified his dismissal: he claimed that he had not spoken
out against Catholic dogma, “such as denying the existence of God, calling
into question the divinity of Christ or the virginity of the Virgin Mary, or
making disparaging remarks about the Pope.”139
The European Court’s Chamber held that Spain did not violate Article 8.140 Private life can include “professional activities”141: “professional life
132 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [Chamber] (Fernández Martı́nez II), App. No. 56030/
07, ¶ 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-110916.
133 Id. ¶ 15.
134 Id. ¶ 18.
135 Id. ¶ 27. Fernández Martı́nez petitioned for this opinion to be nullified, claiming
that two of the judges on the court were known for their “affinities with the Catholic
Church,” and was denied. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
136 Id. ¶ 61.
137 Id.
138 Id. ¶ 63. The Spanish government distinguished this instance from a Spanish Constitutional Court case holding that the non-renewal of a Catholic religious education
teacher in a state secondary school—due to her civil marriage to a divorcee—had violated
her rights to personal and family privacy because “unlike the applicant, the teacher in
question had never made public her situation or campaigned in favour of divorce.” Id.
¶ 67.
139 Id. ¶ 69.
140 Id. ¶ 89.
141 Id. ¶ 57 (citation omitted).
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is part of the zone of interaction between a person and others which, even in
a public context, may fall within the scope of ‘private life.’”142 The nonrenewal of Fernández Martı́nez’s contract affected his ability to work professionally, which reverberated into his private life.143 As part of a statesponsored school system, the bishop could only propose qualified candidates
and was required to respect fundamental rights.144 The Chamber held that
the “requirements of the principles of religious freedom and neutrality preclude it from carrying out any further examination of the necessity and proportionality of the non-renewal decision.”145 It emphasized that the “special
bond of trust” present in religious employment distinguishes it from standard
legal relationships.146 It also noted that the applicant received unemployment benefits and then worked at a museum until his retirement.147
At the Grand Chamber, in a 9–8 de novo decision, the European Court
again held that Spain had not violated Article 8 of the Convention.148 Since
religious organizations’ autonomy is equal to the individual right to family
life, the European Court espouses a balancing test.149 Fernández Martı́nez’s
private, personal choices affected his professional life, and therefore Article 8
applied.150 Unlike the Chamber, the Grand Chamber believed that Spain, as
the employer, had interfered with Fernández Martı́nez’s right to respect for
private life by enforcing the bishop’s decision.151 Yet, Fernández Martı́nez as
a former seminary director would have known that “the public display of his
militant stance on certain precepts of the Church would be at odds with the
applicable provisions of canon law.”152
The interference with his right had a “legitimate aim” of protecting the
right of the Catholic Church’s autonomy regarding its selection of teachers.153 The European Court recognized that religious organizations’ autonomy is “indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society . . . . [There is no]
right of dissent within a religious community.”154 A religious organization
then can require a “degree of loyalty” from those working for them.155 In
this case, Fernández Martı́nez freely had accepted a heightened duty of loy142 Id. (citation omitted).
143 Id. ¶ 60.
144 Id. ¶ 81.
145 Id. ¶ 84.
146 Id. ¶ 85.
147 Id. ¶ 88.
148 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 153
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001145068.
149 Id. ¶ 123.
150 Id. ¶ 113.
151 Id. ¶ 115.
152 Id. ¶ 119.
153 Id. ¶ 122.
154 Id. ¶ 127–28.
155 Id. ¶ 131.
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alty, which legally could limit his Article 8 rights to a degree.156 His duty of
loyalty also derived from his being a Catholic religion teacher.157 His adolescent students lacked the maturity to distinguish his personal beliefs from
Church teaching.158 Whether or not he posed for the photograph in the
article, Fernández Martı́nez had not objected to it.159 The European Court
even saw his dispensation from celibacy as a punishment for the newspaper
article and still did not object to it.160 Spain adequately had balanced Fernández Martı́nez’s Article 8 rights with the Catholic Church’s right to
autonomy.
B.

Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ Balancing Test

The four cases of Siebenhaar, Obst, Schüth, and Fernández Martı́nez elucidate the European Court’s factors in balancing religious communities’ rights
against those of their employees. While the margin of appreciation in these
cases defers broadly to the judgments of state courts, the European Court
utilizes a seven-factor balancing test. Four of the factors pertain to the religious institution, while the other three factors analyze the employee’s rights.
The four factors that scrutinize the religious institution are whether: (1) the
institution’s asserted value aligns with the host country’s law and society, (2)
the belief is central to the religious system, (3) the individual retained an
important position within the religious institution’s structure, and (4) the
employee’s action harms the credibility of the religious organization.161 The
factors weighed with respect to the individual’s interests include whether: (1)
the individual had sufficient knowledge that his or her action would violate
the religious institution’s values, (2) the individual notified the religious
organization of the violating act by his or her own actions, and (3) the
church’s removal of the individual had compromised the individual’s future,
reinforcing an implied right to work.162 As seen in Fernández Martı́nez v.
Spain, though, the European Court may respect a country’s policy of avoiding
an examination of a religious organization’s beliefs in its claim to neutrality
to an extent.163 These factors, while they “look to some degree like a proce156 Id. ¶ 135.
157 Id.
158 Id. ¶ 142.
159 Id. ¶ 136.
160 Id.
161 Id.; Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), translated in Obst v.
Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 44; Schüth v. Germany, App. No. 1620/03 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469.
162 Fernández Martı́nez I, App. No. 56030/07; Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/
02, ¶ 41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), translated in Siebenhaar v. Germany – Chamber Judgment,
supra note 27; Obst, App. No. 425/03; Schüth, App. No. 1620/03.
163 Fernández Martı́nez I, App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 149.
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dural requirement . . . that courts take all relevant rights-related factors into
account . . . are in reality a disguised form of substantive limitation.”164
1.

Factors Concerning the Religious Employer
a.

The Alignment of Values with Law and Society

The European Court’s balancing test weighs a society’s law and values in
deciding religious organizations’ employment issues. In Obst, the Court supported Germany’s decision that a contractual emphasis on fidelity does not
interfere with German society.165 In Schüth, the European Court also mentioned that fidelity was in line with German society.166 This balancing mirrors that in Dogru v. France, in which the prohibition of headscarves in French
elementary schools was “justified as a matter of principle and proportionate
to the aim pursued.”167 The European Court in Siebenhaar emphasized that
the German government only needs to heed a religious organization’s belief
insofar as it aligns with the basic principles of the German legal order.168
Yet, the Court came to different results in Obst and Schüth because of other
factors weighed. In Fernández Martı́nez, Spanish neutrality was considered a
fundamental principle of law in itself.169 Thus, the religious institution’s values asserted must comport with its host country’s law and society.
b.

The Belief’s Centrality Within the Religious System

The state can evaluate the legitimacy of religious beliefs or their means
of expression only in exceptional cases,170 but governments can substantiate
the gravity of violations of those beliefs within the religious organizations.
The European Court sometimes even requires them to do so. In Obst, the
ECtHR sanctioned the consideration that adultery was one of the gravest
164 Carolyn Evans & Anna Hood, Religious Autonomy and Labour Law: A Comparison of the
Jurisprudence of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, 1 OXFORD J.L. &
RELIGION 1, 22 (2012).
165 Obst, App. No. 425/03, ¶¶ 47–51.
166 Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, ¶ 62.
167 Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, ¶ 77 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009), http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90039. The Dogru case shows the difficulty of
such a factor in balancing; while most members of European societies would agree that the
prototypical hypothetical case of religious human sacrifice should be barred regardless of
religious freedom interests, questions of religious freedom and cultural norms are far less
settled with practices that are not as widely prohibited. The religious employment cases
recently decided by the ECtHR involve Christian religions, but this factor could cause conflict if applied to religious acts that are viewed to be different from the norm.
168 Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), translated in
Siebenhaar v. Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 27.
169 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 150
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145
068.
170 Siebenhaar, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 41.
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offenses in the Mormon faith.171 Yet, in Schüth it disapproved of the German
courts’ prima facie acceptance of the Catholic Church’s claim regarding the
importance of Schüth’s position.172 In Fernández Martı́nez’s Grand Chamber
decision, even though Spain’s neutrality disallows investigation into religiously grounded decisions, the Court approvingly noted that Spain still considered the nonrenewal in light of proportionality and constitutionality.173
This investigation potentially allows courts to interpret substantive issues of
faith.
c.

The Importance of the Individual’s Position Within the Religious
Organization

An important factor is the employee’s position of authority within the
religious community.174 The greater an employee publicly represents a religion, the more justified the dismissal. The European Court’s Grand Chamber
respected Spain’s decision because Fernández Martı́nez was a priest and
teacher of the Catholic faith.175 The applicant in Obst worked as the director
of public relations for Europe; he needed to be faithful to his wife because he
represented the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.176 In Siebenhaar,
the applicant’s termination was acceptable because of her public presence
and her interaction with the parents of her kindergarten class.177 Distinguished from Fernández Martı́nez, the European Court doubted a choirmaster’s importance to the Catholic faith; the German courts should not have
rendered a decision “without having regard to the nature of the post in ques171 Obst, App. No. 425/03, ¶¶ 47–48.
172 Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, ¶ 66.
173 Fernández Martı́nez I, App. No. 56030/07, ¶¶ 149–51.
174 Id. ¶ 131.
175 Id. ¶ 135. Stijn Smet maintained that the Fernández Martı́nez Chamber decision created a “ministerial exception” as seen in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in HosannaTabor v. EEOC. Stijn Smet, Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain: Towards a ‘Ministerial Exception’ for
Europe?, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (May 24, 2012), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/
05/24/fernandez-martinez-v-spain-towards-a-ministerial-exception-in-europe/. Smet believed that the ECtHR in the Chamber decision “appear[ed] to have abandoned its tried
and tested formula of ad hoc balancing between the collective dimension of freedom of
religion and individual human rights, established in Obst v. Germany, Schüth v. Germany,
and Siebenhaar v. Germany.” Id. He saw the Grand Chamber decision as scaling back the
“ministerial exception” of the Chamber opinion. Stijn Smet, Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain:
The Grand Chamber Putting the Brakes on the ‘Ministerial Exception’ for Europe?, STRASBOURG
OBSERVERS (June 23, 2014), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/06/23/fernandez-mar
tinez-v-spain-the-grand-chamber-putting-the-breaks-on-the-ministerial-exception-for-eur
ope/. While the Grand Chamber opinion clearly maintains a balancing test, it does indicate a sphere of autonomy over teachers and priests similar to Hosanna-Tabor’s. HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), is discussed infra
Part III.
176 Obst, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 50.
177 Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), translated in
Siebenhaar v. Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 27.
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tion and without properly balancing the interests involved.”178 An
employee’s role in the employer’s mission remains an important factor in the
rights-balancing between religious employers and employees.
d.

The Harm to the Religious Employer Caused by the Employee

Closely linked with the third factor, the final employer-centric factor is
the religious organization’s reasonableness in believing that the employee’s
action could undermine its credibility. The Protestant church could require
loyalty to maintain its credibility.179 The loyalty imposed on Obst, because of
his position within the Church in dialoguing with non-Mormons, sufficiently
was demonstrated to be necessary to preserve the credibility of the Mormon
Church.180 The European Court remained doubtful of Schüth’s influence in
undermining the credibility of the Catholic Church because of his choir
work’s minor presence.181 In Fernández Martı́nez’s Grand Chamber decision,
the ECtHR held that “[t]he existence of a discrepancy between the ideas that
have to be taught and the teacher’s personal beliefs may raise an issue of
credibility if the teacher actively and publicly campaigns against the ideas in
question.”182 Credibility is thus a factor for the European Court.
2.

Factors Concerning the Employee
a.

The Individual’s Knowledge of Transgression

Concerning individual rights, the European Court considers whether
the employee would sufficiently know that his or her actions would upset his
or her religious employer.183 Siebenhaar’s employment contract barred her
from participating in organizations with objectives inconsistent with the Protestant church’s mission.184 She had violated the contract. A contract need
not enumerate these requirements, however. Obst, a lifelong Mormon,
should have known the meaning of the phrase “high moral standard” to
which he assented in his employment contract.185 The married priest in Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain knew that his actions “placed him in a situation of
178 Schüth v. Germany, App. No. 1620/03, ¶ 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469.
179 Siebenhaar, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 46.
180 Obst, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 51.
181 Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, ¶¶ 66–69.
182 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 137
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145
068.
183 A case that shows the necessity of this knowledge for the ECtHR is Lombardi Vallauri
v. Italy, in which the European Court held it unacceptable that the Catholic University of
the Sacred Heart failed to renew a professor’s teaching position because some of his positions were “clearly opposed to Catholic doctrine” without telling him which positions they
were. Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, App. No. 39128/05, ¶ 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009), translated
in Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, supra note 54.
184 Siebenhaar, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 44.
185 Obst, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 50.
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precariousness”; the Court noted favorably that the Catholic Church had
“shown tolerance” in allowing him to teach while married for six years before
the publicity.186
Even so, this factor has limits. In Schüth, the European Court, while recognizing that a church may demand loyalty, stated that certain employees are
not “clericalised” and do not acquire “a special ecclesiastical status which subsumes the employee and dominates his entire private life”; therefore, “the
applicant’s signature on the contract cannot be interpreted as a personal
unequivocal undertaking to live a life of abstinence in the event of separation
or divorce.”187 Although the ECtHR weighs the employee’s knowledge, it
also considers how reasonable it believes the request to be.
b.

The Employee’s Role in Exposing the Problem

The European Court also balances whether the applicant made known
his or her situation. Although an anonymous tip informed the church of
Siebenhaar’s situation, she had been listed on the Universal Church’s registration form for classes on “higher spiritual learning.”188 Obst had informed
members of his church of his affair.189 Schüth, conversely, had not notified
the church of his situation, but rather his young children had exposed it.190
He could not hide his divorce or the birth of his out-of-wedlock child even
without public exposure.191 The publication of an article concerning Fernández Martı́nez’s status as a married priest and participation in the Movement for Optional Celibacy, rather than his status itself, was the subject of the
ECtHR’s analysis.192 If one publicizes his or her private life, the European
Court is more likely to rule in favor of the religious employer.
c.

The Negative Consequences of Dismissal on the Employee’s
Future Career

Although the Convention declines to protect an enumerated right to
work, the European Court will uphold aspects of the right to work.193 The
ECtHR will examine how an employee’s termination affects his or her private
186 Fernández Martı́nez I, App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 146.
187 Schüth v. Germany, App. No. 1620/03, ¶¶ 70–71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469.
188 Siebenhaar, App. No. 18136/02, ¶¶ 11, 44.
189 Obst, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 47.
190 Schüth, App. No. 1620/03, ¶¶ 12, 67.
191 Id. ¶ 67.
192 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 146
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145
068.
193 See Rory O’Connell, The Right to Work in the ECHR, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 176, 176
(2012). The Convention does, however, protect the right to unionize under Article 11,
“[f]reedom of assembly and association,” which states that “[e]veryone has the right to . . .
join trade unions,” and the “[p]rohibition of slavery and forced labour” under Article 4.
Convention, supra note 9, arts. 4, 11.
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life, presuming that an applicant has a right to be employed.194 Siebenhaar
was young and had been employed by the school for a relatively short
time.195 Her dismissal, then, failed to violate her implied right to work. Similarly, the harm resulting from Obst’s dismissal was limited because of his age
and length of service.196
Schüth, conversely, could not easily find work in his field, as churches
monopolize the employment of choirmasters and the Protestant church
required that full time employees be Protestant.197 Given the harm to
Schüth’s occupation, the German government failed to adequately balance
the church’s liberty of religion against his Article 8 rights.198 Although the
Convention fails to enumerate explicitly a right to work, the ECtHR considers the effect of a career change on other aspects of life.
Yet, while the Chamber in Fernández Martı́nez mentioned that Fernández
Martı́nez was able to find work at a museum after collecting unemployment,199 the Grand Chamber did not consider this factor. Instead, it noted
that while ecclesiastical employees will have difficulties finding other jobs, the
bishop had stated that Fernández Martı́nez would receive unemployment
benefits.200 This consideration was enough for the ECtHR. It went so far as
to state that “a less restrictive measure for the applicant would certainly not
have had the same effectiveness in terms of preserving the credibility of the
Church,” since Fernández Martı́nez knew his actions were “completely in
opposition to the Church’s precepts.”201 Since Fernández Martı́nez held an
important position and violated central beliefs, he justifiably could be dismissed. The European Court will allow for harm to the employee’s future
career following dismissal if the other factors greatly support the religious
organization even as it protects an implied right to work.

194 Fernández Martı́nez I, App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 144.
195 Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02, ¶ 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), translated in
Siebenhaar v. Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 27.
196 Obst v. Germany, App. No. 425/03, ¶ 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), translated in Obst v.
Germany – Chamber Judgment, supra note 44.
197 Schüth v. Germany, App. No. 1620/03, ¶ 73 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469.
198 Id. ¶ 75.
199 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [Chamber] (Fernández Martı́nez II), App. No. 56030/
07, ¶ 88 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-110916.
200 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 145
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145
068.
201 Id. ¶ 146.
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TO

Freedom of Religious Organizations Generally

Religious organizations’ freedom from government intervention is a
group right in American jurisprudence and can be seen as a third category of
the First Amendment.202 It arises from the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses and traces a rich lineage from the nation’s founding.203 Religious
institutions in the United States have the constitutional right to define themselves as legal entities, although this right is poorly defined.204 In the context
of religious property disputes, this status has promulgated, at different times,
doctrines of equal treatment to similar organizations,205 deference on matters of religious doctrine,206 and government neutrality.207 These principles
exist within the employment context to a degree as well. Religious organizations retain rights in their own bodies. Yet, these group rights largely are
undefined, leading to sources of conflict in the area of employment.208
At times, the Supreme Court has refused to adjudicate claims about
religious positions.209 In Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, the
Court accepted that canon law was controlling on a claim and refused to
adjudicate it.210 In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in North America, American members of the Russian Orthodox Church
wanted to appoint their own Archbishop, fearing the Soviet Union’s influence over the church.211 A New York law recognized the American branch as
the rightful body of the church.212 The Supreme Court struck down this law,
acknowledging “[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods
of choice are proven.”213 In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States
of America and Canada v. Milivojevich, the Supreme Court reversed an Illinois
decision that had invalidated the Serbian Orthodox Church’s proceedings
for being “arbitrary” by violating its own internal policies,214 but the Supreme
Court held that the Illinois Supreme Court violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in its decision.215 Generally, the Supreme Court attempts not
to interfere with internal decisions of religious organizations. The U.S. gov202 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 14, at 241.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 244.
205 See id. at 245–47 (discussing the early church property cases that led to the elaboration of this doctrine).
206 See id. at 247–51 (detailing the formation of this doctrine).
207 See id. at 251–53 (elaborating on the functions of this doctrine).
208 Id. at 253.
209 Id. at 254.
210 280 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1929).
211 344 U.S. 94, 96–97 (1952).
212 Id. at 97.
213 Id. at 116.
214 426 U.S. 696, 698 (1976).
215 Id.
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ernment could violate the Establishment Clause if it evaluates the beliefs of
religious communities, and statutory protections also can preempt constitutional questions regarding religious employers.216 Thus, the Supreme Court
in some religious employer cases may not need to address constitutional
concerns.
While the Supreme Court allows religious institutions broad leeway in
decisionmaking, one of the issues that pervade First Amendment jurisprudence, as seen in Hosanna-Tabor, is a lack of definition for what constitutes a
“religious” organization.217 The Court has in the past protected religiously
affiliated organizations. In National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, for instance, the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) over an issue involving Catholic schools’ nonunionization of teachers.218 In its decision, it denied the distinction made by
the NLRB between organizations that are “completely religious, [and] just
religiously associated.”219 If Congress’s statute were construed as allowing
NLRB’s jurisdiction, the law would be unconstitutional.220 This issue
remains in Hosanna-Tabor, discussed below.
B.
1.

Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC

Description of the Case

The Supreme Court’s recent decision Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission nationally recognized the First Amendment’s long-held “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination cases.221
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (HosannaTabor) offers a “Christ-centered education.”222 Teachers are either “called”
216 See supra note 29 for examples of statutory exemptions. One of the most important
statutory religious exemptions arises from Title VII, section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and
42 U.S.C. (2012)). Title VII in part prevents discrimination in employment because of
“[an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2012). Section 702 creates an exemption for “religious corporation[s], association[s],
educational institution[s], or societ[ies,] with respect to the employment of individuals of
a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on . . . of its activities.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Without this provision, a religious employer would be inhibited from
selecting employees without state interference, thus placing Title VII “at the risk of violating the First Amendment.” Evans & Hood, supra note 164, at 4.
217 For a detailed analysis of the “elephant in the room” of Hosanna-Tabor, the lack of
definition of the term “religious,” and the circuit split dealing with the issue in the light of
the rise of new forms of faith groups, see Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor,
10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2012).
218 440 U.S. 490, 493, 507 (1979).
219 Id. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220 See id. at 507.
221 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012).
222 Id. at 699 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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or “lay.”223 Hosanna-Tabor understands “called” teachers to have a Godgiven vocation, and requires them to meet additional requirements to receive
the title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”224 The school could only
revoke a “call” by a supermajority vote and for cause.225 This stipulation contrasts the lay teachers’ employment terms, which require neither religious
training nor even sharing the faith.226 The respondent, Perich, taught a variety of subjects concurrently, including religion, until narcolepsy required her
to take a disability leave.227 Perich attempted to regain her position with her
doctor’s permission, but the school notified her that a lay teacher had filled
it.228 Administrators were concerned about her availability, and so the congregation offered her a “peaceful release from her call,” by which they would
pay a portion of her health insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation.229 Perich refused to resign, producing the doctor’s note that confirmed her ability to work.230 The board emphasized that it had no position
for her and urged her to reconsider, but she declined.231
Perich came to school on the first day that she was medically cleared to
work and refused to leave until given documentation noting that she had
returned.232 The school principal called her that afternoon and informed
her that she likely would be fired, to which she responded that she had consulted an attorney and would assert her legal rights.233 The congregation
voted to rescind her call because of her “insubordination and disruptive
behavior,” citing her threat of legal action, and sent her a termination letter.234 In turn, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).235
The district court granted Hosanna-Tabor summary judgment on the
“ministerial exception,” holding that Perich was a minister and had been
fired for violating the church’s tenet that “Christians should resolve their disputes internally.”236 The court of appeals recognized the “ministerial exception,” but claimed that it did not apply because her “duties as a called teacher
were identical to her duties as a lay teacher.”237
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
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All nine Justices of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hosanna-Tabor,
elucidating the “ministerial exception” for the first time at the national level.
The Court explained that the First Amendment necessitates the freedom “of
religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith,
and carry out their mission,” without inquiry into the reasons for dismissal.238
In its opinion, the Court held that the “ministerial exception” finds its existence within both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment.239 The unanimous opinion noted that “[t]he interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly
important,” but the First Amendment has struck the balance of these
rights.240 The “ministerial exception” is part of the Constitution, in contrast
to legislative religious exceptions that arise out of “benevolent neutrality”
toward religion.241
2.

An Analysis of Hosanna-Tabor Through the Seven-Factor Test of the
European Court

As examined in Part II, the European Court’s rights-balancing, while
allowing religious organizations some autonomy, uses a seven-factor test.
Similarly, the “ministerial exception” is not a jurisdictional bar that would
prevent the case from being adjudicated, but instead an “affirmative defense
to an otherwise cognizable claim.”242 Therefore, the Supreme Court also
can weigh a number of considerations in its decision. Analyzing the unanimous Supreme Court decision in Hosanna-Tabor by the European Court’s
factors illuminates the American understanding of religious freedom. This
analysis displays the benefits of the Supreme Court’s approach in HosannaTabor in protecting the rights of religious employers.
That the Supreme Court does not analyze some of the European Court
factors partially elucidates why American jurisprudence defers more to religious employers’ decisions. The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not
consider the three employee-centered factors that the European Court analyzes. The first two factors, sufficient knowledge that one’s action violates the
238 Id. at 710.
239 Id. at 702. The Court noted that, in other situations, these two clauses could be in
tension with one another. Id.
240 Id. at 710.
241 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). A religious exemption to the criminality of smoking peyote falls under this category of constitutionally unprotected religious
expression that may be legislatively protected under Employment Divison v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990) (“Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process.”).
In response to Smith, Congress passed a number of laws to protect freedoms unrecognized
constitutionally after this ruling, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (2012), which governs federal action after its application
to state law was declared unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2012).
242 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4.
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religious organization’s standards and an employee’s publication of his or
her private life, were inapplicable in this case because it involved disability
discrimination. The absence of these two factors highlights the breadth of
the “ministerial exception.” It could apply even in cases in which there may
be no employee culpability—although Hosanna-Tabor’s admittedly narrow
holding leaves the possibility that American courts may determine culpability
between religious employers and their employees in future cases. The Court
“express[es] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits,
including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”243
Fundamentally, the absence of a right to work in American jurisprudence eliminates the European Court’s third employee-centric factor: how
the dismissal affects the employee’s career. In the United States, a religious
organization can fire an employee for violating religious standards.244 Without a right to work, courts can more greatly protect the rights of religious
employers. No equal employment right exists to balance against religious
employers’ rights. Although the Supreme Court recognizes that “[t]he interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is
undoubtedly important,” it acknowledges that “the First Amendment has
struck the balance” for it.245 The absence of a countervailing right to work
restrains the Supreme Court from engaging in the same balancing test as the
European Court.
While the ECtHR in its rights-balancing will determine a belief’s importance to the religious organization, the Supreme Court explicitly refuses to
address it.246 The European Court allows a limited freedom to decline to
renew an employment contract, but only for judicially verified, important
religious violations. The Supreme Court has emphasized, conversely, that
“[t]he purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire
a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister . . . is the
243 Id. at 710.
244 Evans & Hood, supra note 164, at 7. Lower courts in the United States, however,
have held that religious employers can fire women for premarital sex if contrary to its
religious tenets, but “cannot fire women for being pregnant out of wedlock. The rationale
behind this distinction is that a prohibition on premarital sex can be applied to both men
and women equally but a prohibition on premarital pregnancy can only be applied to
women and thus constitutes sex discrimination.” Id. (footnote omitted).
245 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
246 Even the dissent in the 9–8 decision of Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain highlights the
different approaches of the two courts. To support its argument against the state’s deference to the church’s decision, the dissent asserts that the European Court should not
investigate religious claims. Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App.
No. 56030/07, ¶¶ 24, 30, 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-145068 (Spielmann, Sajo, Karakas, Lemmens, Jaderblom,
Vehabovic, Dedov, and Saiz-Arnaiz, JJ., dissenting). Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s
unanimous refusal to examine religious claims serves the very purpose of deferring to a
religious institution’s decision.
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church’s alone.”247 The European Court criticized the German courts for
accepting prima facie the Catholic Church’s claim that a choirmaster was
important enough to fire for personal transgressions.248 Instead, domestic
courts, it asserted, must “conduct[ ] an in-depth examination” of a case in
balancing rights, including considering the centrality of a belief.249 Indeed,
the ECtHR’s Fernández Martı́nez opinion contained eight canons of the Catholic Church’s canon law.250 In the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, alternately, claims based on religious transgressions are acceptable, no matter
how unimportant a secular court may consider it. Religious organizations
may “establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and . . . create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters.”251 The decisions of these tribunals are binding on civil courts.252
Indeed, Justice Thomas’s concurrence called for deference to a religious
organization by quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos: “[I]t is a significant burden on a religious
organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of
its activities a secular court will consider religious. . . . [A]n organization
might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its
religious tenets and sense of mission.”253 The Supreme Court declines to
consider where the belief ranks in importance for a religious organization
because of religious organizations’ right to noninterference regarding their
own doctrines.
Some of the European Court’s factors play a role in American jurisprudence. One factor the European Court weighs—the importance of a member’s position to the religious organization—drives the “ministerial
exception.” The “ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation.”254 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court, however, was
“reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”255 The Court declined to list any generalized factors, but
considered that the congregation “held Perich out as a minister,” giving her a
distinct role.256 The congregation prayed that God would “‘bless’ [her] ministrations.”257 She needed religious training, special qualifications, and an
247 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709.
248 Schüth v. Germany, App. No. 1620/03, ¶ 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469.
249 Fernández Martı́nez I, App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 132.
250 Id. ¶ 58.
251 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted).
252 Id.
253 Id. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
254 Id. at 707 (majority opinion).
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. (alteration in original).
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official commission by the congregation, a process that spanned six years.258
On her tax return, Perich accepted a housing allowance for employees working “in the exercise of the ministry.”259 Finally, she performed “important
religious functions” for the congregation in addition to teaching.260 Therefore, the Court determined that she was a minister. This opinion may have
influenced the ECtHR Grand Chamber in Fernández Martı́nez, as the Chamber’s case stressed that Fernández Martı́nez was a “secularised priest,”261 thus
driving the distinction, whereas the Grand Chamber noted a religion teacher
has a “crucial function requiring special allegiance.”262
The majority opinion in Hosanna-Tabor “use[d] church, religious group,
and religious institution interchangeably”263 and attempted to avoid
“adopt[ing] a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a
minister.”264 It restricted its analysis to the case’s facts. The prudent course
may be to define minister on a case-by-case basis, rather than to form a standard definition. Further, the Court may have concern that definitions of
“minister” would impede the free exercise of nonstandard religions and violate the Establishment Clause. Its analysis could give preferential legal status
to traditional, most likely Christian, understandings of religion. As Brian
Murray notes, Justice Thomas’s concurrence recognized that the question of
“who is a minister” entails acknowledging “which institutions can have
ministers.”265
The concurrences highlight this concern—who qualifies as a minister—
that the majority opinion is wary of addressing. The joint concurrence by
Justices Alito and Kagan also noted that the term “minister” is insufficient
given the United States’ growing religious diversity: “[t]he term ‘minister’ is
commonly used by many Protestant denominations to refer to members of
their clergy, but the term is rarely if ever used in this way by Catholics, Jews,
258 Id.
259 Id. at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted).
260 Id.
261 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [Chamber] (Fernández Martı́nez II), App. No. 56030/
07, ¶ 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-110916.
262 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 135
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145
068.
263 Murray, supra note 217, at 502. Justice Thomas, citing Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, stated that
[j]udicial attempts to fashion a civil definition of “minister” through a bright-line
test or multi-factor analysis risk disadvantaging those religious groups
[that] . . . are outside of the “mainstream” or [that are] unpalatable to some.
Moreover, uncertainty about whether its ministerial designation will be rejected,
and a corresponding fear of liability, may cause a religious group to conform its
beliefs and practices . . . to the prevailing secular understanding.
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring).
264 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
265 Murray, supra note 217, at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists.”266 This functional approach, however,
increases the risk that courts will investigate what constitutes religion. The
two courts may converge more on this issue in light of the June 2014 Grand
Chamber decision in Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain.
Unlike the ECtHR, Justice Thomas would “defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister,” as “[a] religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would be hollow . . . if secular
courts could second-guess the organization’s sincere determination”; there
could be no “bright-line test or multi-factor analysis,” which would force a
religious group to “conform its beliefs and practices regarding ‘ministers’ to
the prevailing secular understanding.”267 Justices Alito and Kagan in their
concurrence called for a functional test applying to anyone who “leads a
religious organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”268 This
unresolved tension could lead to an analysis similar to the European Court’s
regarding whether one’s employment falls under the exception.
The Supreme Court, along with its European counterpart, also considered whether the religious organization’s action comports with generally
established legal principles. It retraced the United States’ history of religious
freedom to establish that religious organizations’ unrestricted choice of ministers has been a fundamental legal norm from the country’s early years.269
Since the legal heritage of the United States includes religious organizations’
autonomy over minister selection, it is an established part of law and society.
It is a longstanding legal principle. No need exists to investigate whether a
religious organization’s religious claim for firing a minister is a pretext.270
Hence, this “ministerial exception” exists concurrently with Employment
Division v. Smith, which holds that “generally applicable, religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest.”271 In Smith, the Court
upheld a general prohibition on peyote that inhibited its ritual use.272 The
Court in Hosanna-Tabor stated that the “ADA’s prohibition on retaliation . . . is a valid and neutral law of general applicability.”273 Yet, “Smith
involved government regulation of only outward physical acts” while
Hosanna-Tabor, “in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”274
The ADA still retains legitimacy and may be asserted against religious
employers in other suits, and religious employers may still be sued under
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Alito & Kagan, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 712 (Alito & Kagan, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 702–03 (majority opinion).
Id. at 709.
494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990).
Id.
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
Id.
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other laws of general applicability.275 Because the “ministerial exception”
finds its basis in the Constitution and as a general principle of law, it can exist
concurrently with Smith. The constitutionally based “ministerial exception”
prevails over the statutory nondiscrimination right; other decisions may still
weigh other legal principles against the religious organizations’ rights along a
Smith test.
Finally, this comparison shows that the United States’ culture accepts
certain religious norms. In Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain, the European Court
refused to examine whether the priest’s actions caused his dismissal, potentially an Article 8 violation, as he had been able to maintain his teaching
position although it was well-known that he was a “married priest.”276 Only
publication caused concern.277 The European Court declined to comment
on whether the Catholic Church could refuse to renew the contract of a married priest who had not willfully exposed his lifestyle: there is not an easy
answer to this question for the European Court. The unanimity of the Justices in Hosanna-Tabor shows this common culture regarding religious
employers’ rights.278 Both parties in oral argument “conceded that a Roman
Catholic priest who is dismissed for getting married could not sue the church
and claim that his dismissal was actually based on a ground forbidden by the
federal antidiscrimination laws.”279 Yet, “[t]he Roman Catholic Church’s
insistence on clerical celibacy may be much better known than the Lutheran
Church’s doctrine of internal dispute resolution, but popular familiarity with
a religious doctrine cannot be the determinative factor.”280 In the United
States, clerical celibacy is uncontroversial as a value upon which a religious
organization may insist. The more difficult issues for both jurisdictions, then,
arise in cases where religions are outside of the cultural norm.
CONCLUSION
The European Court of Human Rights’ factor test highlights the
supremacy of religious rights in the United States as seen in Hosanna-Tabor v.
EEOC. Only four of the European Court’s seven factors consider the religious employer. These factors—religious tenets’ harmony with law and soci275 See id. at 710 (“Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit.
We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits . . . .”).
276 Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [GC] (Fernández Martı́nez I), App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 146
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145
068; Fernández Martı́nez v. Spain [Chamber] (Fernández Martı́nez II), App. No. 56030/07,
¶ 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001110916.
277 Fernández Martı́nez I, App. No. 56030/07, ¶ 146.
278 This unanimity underscores one of the differences between American jurisprudence and that of the European Court. The ECtHR Grand Chamber decision in Fernández
Martı́nez v. Spain was narrow, with nine judges asserting that there was no violation of the
European Convention and eight judges admonishing that Fernández Martı́nez’s rights had
been violated. Id. ¶ 155.
279 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 715–16 (Alito & Kagan, JJ., concurring).
280 Id. at 716.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL110.txt

452

unknown

Seq: 34

notre dame law review

8-DEC-14

14:53

[vol. 90:1

ety, the asserted belief’s centrality to the religious system, the importance of
the employee’s position to the organization, and the organization’s potential
credibility loss in retaining the employee—have varying degrees of relevance
within the American system.
Religious employers’ freedom to choose their ministers has been so fundamental from the United States’ inception that it is a general principle of
law. This fundamentality brings the “ministerial exception” outside of the
purview of Smith limitations. As demonstrated in Part II, the European system will allow countries to respect the religious decisions of religious organizations. Hence a modified “ministerial exception” can be a fundamental
aspect of law and society for a state. It can account for tradition within a
domestic system. Yet, the European Court weighs this fundamental principle
of law in relation to a number of other considerations.
Unlike the European Court, the Supreme Court purposely does not analyze a belief’s centrality to a religious system because such an analysis would
violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
The United States recognizes that such a determination would undermine
religious autonomy. The Supreme Court understands the vitality of religious
institutions broadly. The European Court does not. In deference to religious institutions, the American constitutional system does not assess the institutions’ credibility damage. The European system may require religious
organizations to prove that an employee damages their mission, harms the
credibility of their tenets, or exposes them to claims of hypocrisy. The American system, however, defers to a religious institution’s choice of its own ministers. Religious organizations retain autonomy over difficult governance
questions arguably best left to their own discretion.
In the case of employees who lack formal religious titles, the European
Court will analyze how important the job is to the faith. One of its major
concerns is how much the employee interacts with the general public. This
factor may count in U.S. decisions. All nine Supreme Court Justices recognized the “ministerial exception,” but the majority opinion in Hosanna-Tabor
refused to analyze what it entails beyond the facts of the case itself. The two
concurrences proposed different inquiries, from deferential treatment to a
functional analysis. Courts may need to decide which method best protects
both religious employers and individual rights.
The Supreme Court, while placing limits on some aspects of freedom of
religion, understands the freedom of religious employers in a robust way.
The “ministerial exception” allows for a rigorous religious freedom that is
not shared in the European system. The European Court’s balancing test,
while retaining some use in an American context, requires a degree of probing into the religious sphere. While there are still unresolved tensions in
American religious employment jurisprudence, the “ministerial exception”
recognizes religious freedom as a fundamental right and gives broad deference to religious organizations’ authority over delicate issues of leadership.

